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THE IMPACT OF STUDENT LOANS ON EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT: 
THE CASE OF A PROGRAM AT THE PONTIFICAL CATHOLIC 
UNIVERSITY OF PERU 
 
 




En las últimas décadas, la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú (PUCP) 
ha otorgado préstamos estudiantiles a algunos estudiantes con 
rendimiento académico satisfactorio pero que enfrentan problemas 
económicos que pudieran poner en peligro su continuidad como 
estudiantes. Aunque el programa fue creado hace más de cuarenta años, 
sus resultados nunca  han sido evaluados en forma rigurosa. Este 
documento intenta evaluar hasta qué punto el programa ha beneficiado a 
los estudiantes. Debido a que la información disponible proviene de 
records académicos, el cumplimiento de este objetivo requiere el uso de 
técnicas modernas diseñadas para trabajar con datos no experimentales. 
Estimando por el método de propensity score matching, encuentro un 
impacto estadísticamente significativo sobre el número de semestres 
necesarios para culminar los estudios solo cuando el estudiante recibió el 
préstamo por 6 semestres o más. También se encontró un impacto 
significativo sobre la probabilidad de concluir los estudios seis años y 
medio después de haberlos iniciado, para el caso de estudiantes que 





During the past decades, the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru (known 
as PUCP) has been giving student loans to some of its students with 
satisfactory academic performance but who face certain economic 
problems which might interrupt their studies. Although this program was 
created more than forty years ago, its results have not been rigorously 
evaluated. This document attempts to assess to what extent the program 
has benefited students. Because the collected data come from academic   2 
and social records, the completion of this task requires using modern 
techniques specifically designed to work with non experimental data. 
After estimating by propensity score matching with multiple treatments, I 
find a statistically significant impact of this program on the time a student 
employs to complete the course of study at PUCP (measured in 
semesters) only when a student was awarded with a loan for 6 semesters 
or more. That effect is not significantly different from zero when the loan 
lasts less than 6 semesters. Similar results were found when I analyzed 
the impact on the probability of degree completion of student loans, 
where students with loan were more likely to meet all graduation 
requirements by 6 years and a half after they start studying at PUCP. 
Again this effect was significant only when the student participates in the 
program for six semesters or more.  However, the impact on that 
probability was small. 
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THE IMPACT OF STUDENT LOANS ON EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT: 
THE CASE OF A PROGRAM AT THE PONTIFICAL CATHOLIC 
UNIVERSITY OF PERU 
 
Luis García Núñez 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
During the past decades, the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru 
(Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, known as PUCP for its initials in 
Spanish) has been giving student loans to some of its students with 
satisfactory academic performance but who face certain economic 
problems which might interrupt their studies.  
 
Although this program was created more than forty years ago, its results 
have not been rigorously evaluated. This document attempts to assess to 
what extent the program has benefited students. Because the collected 
data come from academic and social records, the completion of this task 
requires using modern techniques specifically designed to work with non 
experimental data.  
 
To my knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to evaluate a student 
loan program in Peru. Since student loans are not common in Peruvian 
society, discovering  the  effectiveness of such a program could give us 
insight on what would happen if student loans were offered in this 
country, and what would be necessary to make them effective. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the importance of 
student  loans and the existence of that kind of programs for higher 
education in Peru. Section 3 presents the identification strategy I employ 
to estimate the impact. Section 4 describes the data and variables. 
Section 5 presents the main results of this research. Finally, section 6 
concludes and discusses further topics to be analyzed. 
   4 
2.  STUDENTS LOANS AND THE PROGRAM IN PERU 
 
Since the 20
th century, economic and social research has recognized that 
education is an essential path to overcome social differences and poverty 
(Sen, 2000). Several studies on the returns of education have shown that 
individuals who have the opportunity to receive an education are able to 
develop themselves in modern societies as professionals and earn enough 
income to break the “poverty trap” in which their families have been 
caught for generations. 
 
The question that governments and educational institutions ask 
themselves is how to improve access to education for those individuals 
who otherwise do not have the opportunity to study. In this sense, 
student loans become a powerful instrument to help those individuals to 
overcome this difficulty. The main objective of student loans as a social 
program  in less developed countries is to equalize the educational 




though social differences in less developed countries may be strong, 
student loans may help to reduce these differences.  
Student loans  in contrast to scholarships  have become a  popular 
financial aid for students in many countries
2
                                                 
1   In particular, students who come from low-income families or those who come from an 
environment in which it has been difficult to develop professional skills. 
  due to their multiple 
advantages: they relate future earnings to present needs, and they are 
not restricted to a fixed fund since they are self-financed with the 
amounts repaid. However, student loan programs also face problems that 
could make them difficult to implement without essential participation in 
the public sector. In countries where credit markets are not developed, 
there still exist students who are not eligible for new loans because of the 
absence of financial products attractive enough for borrowers and 
2   See for example Kim (2007) in the United States, Callender and Kemp (2000) for the 
UK experience, Canton and Blom (2004) for the Mexican case, and Larrain and Zurita 
(2008) for Chilean programs.   5 
lenders. Another important problem is the absence of a credit culture 
among borrowers. 
 
Unfortunately, in Peru we observe a very low rate of loans for students in 
higher education (less than 3%), one of the lowest rates of in the region 
(IADB-WB-APICE, 2009). The majority of these loans have been granted 
by the public National Institute of Scholarships and Student Loans (known 
as INABEC for its initials in Spanish, and recently renamed OBEC), and 
the rest have been given by non-profit organizations or educative 
institutions such as universities and technical schools. It is important to 
note that the private financial institutions (such as banks) have a 
minimum of participation in these kinds of credit loans. Despite the great 
expansion of other kinds of credit in our economy in recent years, we do 




In this context of a significant lack of credit for students in Peru, this 
work focuses on the experience of the Pontifical Catholic University of 
Peru (PUCP) as a student loan granter and attempts to evaluate is 
effectiveness through an impact study. Although its scope was limited to 
PUCP students, we can learn some lessons from this experience in Peru. 
 
In 1967, the PUCP created this new student loan  program to assist 
students who had financial problems that could threaten their 
continuation as regular students. Two conditions were stipulated to apply 
for a loan: (a) the family income was not high enough to pay academic 
fees; and (b) a generally satisfactory academic performance. To evaluate 
these two conditions, a permanent commission composed of social 
workers and academic representatives was established. Further 
regulations specified that condition (a) meant a family income below four 
                                                 
3   It is not the objective of this work to answer why Peru has such low participation rates. 
Nevertheless, the problems that may cause this result are well known: the absence of 
real guarantees and collateral (especially for low income students) and the fact that 
human capital cannot be taken as collateral; a still insignificant credit culture within 
Peruvian society; the absence of a national policy to back up the loans with public 
funds, etc.   6 
times the legal minimum wage, and that condition (b) meant a weighted 
average grade above 60% of the maximum possible score.
4
 
  A student 
granted for the loan did not pay tuition and fees for one year (two 
academic semesters), and in special cases could receive extra funds for 
lunch and books. These extra funds were not part of the loan. After the 
student’s date of graduation, a grace period of six months was 
established. After that, students were required to contact the authorities 
at PUCP and to provide a repayment plan. These rules were maintained 
for about 30 years with minor changes, but at the beginning of the new 
century the program was revised with stricter conditions. These new 
conditions are not presented here because they were applied outside the 
period of analysis of this paper.
  
It is important to mention that during the first three decades of the 
program the repayment rate was very low, which worried the university 
authorities. The absence of punishment to individuals defaulting on their 
loans, and the inability of the PUCP to take legal action and retrieve the 
money, was a serious problem for the continuation of the program. It 
also caused the program to be perceived among many students as a 




For many reasons, the thresholds mentioned above were never strict. It 
was very common to observe students receiving a loan without fulfilling 
these conditions. Some of the reasons why this happened were: different 
schools inside the PUCP had different standards to grade their students 
(e.g. absolute average grades for engineering and economics were 
particularly low compared to administration and accountability); and the 
                                                 
4   The academic grading in Peru employs a scale from 0 to 20 points, where the passing 
threshold is 11 points. These scores are absolute, not relative to the class. In higher 
education, a student who gets a score in the range 0-10 in one course must repeat that 
course. A student who repeats the same course three times is expelled from school. The 
weighted average score is calculated by semester using the number of credits of each 
course as weights. The cumulative score is the weighted average score of all courses 
taken (whether passed or not) since the first semester to the present. 
5   The author, as a former student at PUCP in the late 80’s and early 90’s and former 
beneficiary of this program, was a witness to this assertion.   7 
committee took into account other academic factors beyond the 
cumulative average scores, such as reports on applicant motivation and 
perception from his teachers. The committee also considered the 
background of the applicant, with a thorough study of his family’s 
socioeconomic situation. It was also understood by the committee that 
other personal and qualitative factors (the environment in which the 
student grew up, his relationship with his parents, the development of 
skills during childhood, and socialization problems) could affect his 
performance as a student. Another important matter that characterized 
this program was that students applied voluntarily for the loans, and the 
committee decided who would be the beneficiary. Social workers who 
were former members of this committee state that loans were granted to 




In order to define the amounts the students must pay for tuition and 
fees, the PUCP has a tiered-fee payment structure which takes into 
account the income distribution in Peruvian society and seeks to ensure 
that all students can receive education regardless of financial 
circumstances. Currently there are five levels, with Level 1 corresponding 
to the low-income students and Level 5 for those students with higher 
income. When students are admitted to PUCP, a thorough socioeconomic 
study is conducted to determine into which scale each student is 
classified. This study collects socioeconomic information through a 
socioeconomic application form and house visits to verify the information 
provided. It also includes interviews with parents and other relatives. 
 
After students were classified into one of the levels, they could be 
reclassified at any time if any change occurred that worsened their 
financial situation. They could then apply for the loan in that case. In 
either case, a new socioeconomic study was conducted. In addition, 
students  granted with  a loan were permanently monitored in order to 
                                                 
6   All this information was provided to the author during several interviews of current and 
former authorities at PUCP.   8 
detect any positive change in their financial status. If this occurred (or if 
their academic performance was not as good as expected  a 
controversial point as discussed above), they could be expelled from the 
program. These rules meant that some students benefited over a number 
of semesters; in some cases students received loans for their whole stay 
at PUCP, and other students benefited for one semester only. 
 
To have some figures about the program in the 90’s, Table 1 shows the 
stock of students from the 1998-2 semester (fall) to 2002-1 (spring), 




Number of Students at PUCP by loan status and tiered fee system 
   With Loan  Without Loan  Total 
Level  1   2  1   2   3   4  5    6*    
Semester                            
1998-2  691  0  3,649  2,556  2,223  1,686  988  1,304  13,097 
1999-1  666  0  3,937  2,744  2,332  1,717  970  1,267  13,633 
1999-2  729  7  4,086  2,934  2,434  1,671  871  1,194  13,926 
2000-1  733  0  4,284  3,241  2,508  1,757  967  1,210  14,700 
2000-2  724  2  4,436  3,225  2,531  1,676  896  1,096  14,586 
2001-1  665  1  4,298  3,353  2,706  1,813  898  1,104  14,838 
2001-2  626  0  4,529  3,475  2,614  1,712  774  1,011  14,741 
2002-1  504  1  4,744  3,724  2,791  1,793  1,758*  --  15,315 
2002-2  434  0  4,871  3,866  2,747  1,676  1,507  --  15,101 
* Since 2002, levels 5 and 6 where unified. 
Source: PUCP date bases 
 
 
As we can see in this table, less than 5% of students apply  and are 
elected for a loan out of the total student population. As expected, the 
majority of students who applied for and benefited  from this program 
belonged to Stratum 1 (the low-income group), while only a few cases 
belonged to Stratum 2. Therefore, the participation rate increases when 
we consider only the group that seems to be the “target population”, 
students at Stratum 1. However, simple calculations show that these 
rates declined over time.   9 
The expected impact of the program was, as mentioned, to give the 
opportunity to more students to complete their higher education at PUCP, 
one of the best universities in Peru. To translate these intentions into 
quantitative outcomes, I defined two indicators to be evaluated. One is 
the number of semesters the student needs to complete the course of 
study. A student with financial problems may choose either to apply for a 
loan or to work and study. This latter option will affect the time the 
student dedicates to studies, which may prolong the time required to 
pass all courses in the program. Besides, since students can choose the 
number of courses they take each semester, fewer courses could be 
desirable for working students and it would also mean lower fees (which 
they could afford). On the other hand, a student who benefits from a loan 
can take as many courses as he wants (depending only on his time and 
capabilities), and the program forbids the student to work. 
 
The other indicator to be evaluated is the probability of completing the 
course of study and getting a bachelor’s degree at PUCP.
7
 
 If a student 
faces financial problems, they could be serious enough to compel the 
student to quit studying at PUCP (perhaps moving to a cheaper and less 
time-demanding school, or to the labor market). In contrast, students in 
the program have more chances to succeed in their studies. 
The data available for this study comes from students’ records, and may 
suffer of some data problems. Therefore, I need to define an empirical 
strategy that will produce reliable statistical results. The next section 
focus on this empirical strategy. 
 
 
                                                 
7   According to Peruvian laws, the Bachelor’s degree is attained automatically once the 
student completes all required courses and credits that the school defines in the course 
of study.   10 
3.  IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY 
 
One possibility to evaluate the impact of student loans is to model 
structural equations on the determinants of the endogenous variables and 
to  use regression methods  to estimate this impact. However, these 
methods have been criticized as evaluation method in observational 
studies due to their inefficacy to overcome the “confounder problem”, to 
suffer of sample selection problems, and because they frequently suffer 
of endogeneity in the treatment variable. Some studies have shown (see 
for example, Lalonde, 1986) that OLS results are far from those we could 
obtain in randomized experiments. Besides, they rely on some strong 
assumptions on the distribution of error to make statistical inference, 
being those errors unobservable for the researcher (Angrist, Imbens y 
Rubin, 1996). In addition, regression analysis depicts associative 
relationships and any causal inference is based on opinions and beliefs 
rather than on objective evidence. For these reasons, it will not be 
appropriate to make causal inference based on associative parameters. 
 
To have a statistically valid measurement of the impact of student loans, 
I employ the standard methodology which relies on the works of Rubin 
(1974) and Holland (1985), known as the Neyman-Rubin Model or Roy-
Rubin Model. In this framework, the observed outcomes of the program 
are compared with the potential outcomes in a hypothetical scenario 
where individuals subject to treatment do not receive it. The well-known 
fundamental problem of causal inference applies in this case because only 
one of those two potential outcomes is observable. Dealing with this 
difficulty, the proposed “statistical solution” requires reconstructing the 
counterfactual scenario using data from those untreated individuals, 
which in this study refers to students who did not participate in the 
student loan program. 
 
However, concerns on the comparability of these two groups arise since 
we are using observational data, in which differences in outcomes from   11 
treated and untreated individuals may be caused not only due to 
differences in participation in the program (students receiving a loan), but 
also due to other observable and unobservable characteristics of the 
students. If we had experimental data (in whose case the treated 
population would have been chosen randomly), those characteristics 
would be balanced across those groups and we did not worry on the 
simple mean comparison of treated and untreated outcomes. 
Unfortunately, an experiment is not ethically feasible in the case of 
student loans due to the serious long run consequences that may occur if 





Inasmuch as our data available  comes from student records, our 
identification strategy needs to control for those observable covariates 
which could confound the effect of student loans on the proposed 
indicators. This also requires certain untestable assumptions on the data 
generation process which are discussed here. 
 
Before formalizing the identification strategy, it is important to remark 
that in this program, it is not relevant to describe the program 
participation by a binary variable because the different intensity of the 
treatment (measured by the number of semesters the student 
participated in the student loan  program) varies across beneficiary 
students. As a consequence a multiple treatment analysis is used in this 
work (Imbens 2000, Lechner, 2001). 
 
Following Lechner (2001) notation, let  i y  be the outcome of the program 
and  let  } , , 1 , 0 { M S  ∈   be  the program participation variable  who also 
measures the intensity of the treatment. Let 
j
i y be the potential outcome 
for individual i if he receives treatment  j S = . After the student graduates 
                                                 
8   Do not be benefited by the program is harmful for the student because the loose of 
opportunities. It is not like the placebo used in medicine.   12 
(or quit studying), only one of those potential outcomes is observable for 
the researcher. Also, let  i x be the set of observed covariates and  i ε the set 
of unobserved covariates for student i. 
 
I am interested in pair wise comparison of outcomes, where the outcome 
for  0 = S   is compared with any other result for  0 > S . The average 
treatment effect on the treated for individuals who received treatment 
m S =  is defined as (omitting subscripti) 
] | [ ] | [ ] | [
0 0 0 , m S y E m S y E m S y y E
m m m = − = = = − = θ       (1) 
 
Clearly the second term in the right-hand side of equation (1) is not 
observed. 
 
Some assumptions are needed to identify the effect. The  conditional 
independence assumption of potential outcomes states that x S y y | ,
1 0   . 
To our task we do not need this strong assumption, it is only necessary to 
assume that  
} , 0 { , |
0 m S x S y ∈            (2) 
 
to identify the effect in equation (1).  Under this assumption, 
] 0 , | [ ] , | [
0 0 = = = S x y E m S x y E . Besides, if we assume that  
S j x P
j , 0 1 ) ( 0 = ∀ < <         (3) 
 
which is the usual common support assumption  where  ) (x P
j   is the 
probability to participate in  j S =  for an individual with characteristics x, 
then it is true that 
] | ] 0 , | [ [ ] | [
0 0 m S S x y E E m S y E x = = = = .     (4) 
 
The right hand side expression can be estimated by sample analogs. 
   13 
The well-known problem of dimensionality
9
} , 0 { ), ( |
0 | 0 m S x P S y
m m ∈ 
  can be solved by using 
propensity scores. According to Lechner (2001) who extends Rosenbaum 
and Rubin (1983) result, if (2) and (3) hold, then , 
where  ) (
0 | x P
m m is the probability of receiving treatment m on the 
subpopulation  } , 0 { m S∈  given observed pre-treatment variables  x. Then 
using propensity scores we can identify 
0 , m θ  and the multiple treatment 
models have been compressed to several binary treatment models. 
 
Under this setting, we could apply standard matching methods (Rubin, 
1973; Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1997, 1998; Dehejia and Wahba, 
2002; Caliendo and Kopeining, 2005) to estimate the impact. The first 
step is to define an empirical counterpart of equations (1) and (4). Let T  
be the set of all treated individuals and let N   the set of untreated 
students; let’s define the comparison group for treated student i  as 
{ } )) ( ˆ ( ) ( ˆ |





i x P v x P N k A ∈ ∈ =   where  ) ( ˆ 0 | x P
m m   are propensity scores 
which are estimated by Probit and )) ( (
0 |
i




m m x P . This set contains one unit in the case of nearest neighbor 
matching  in whose case { } ) ( ˆ ) ( ˆ min |




i i − ∈ = , but it could be 
empty if we define a minimum distance. In the case of radius matching, 
all individual in a range around  ) (
0 |
i
m m x P are included, so 
{ } δ < − ∈ = ) ( ˆ ) ( ˆ |




i i . There is another estimator, the kernel 
matching estimator in which the comparison groups contains all the 
individuals in the untreated group, N Ai = . When more than one individual 
could be used to reconstruct the counterfactual scenario - i A   contains 
more than one element-, we need to weight the observations with a 
weighting function ) , ( k i ω , 1 ) , ( 0 ≤ ≤ k i ω , and  1 ) , ( = ∑
∈ i A k
k i ω . For kernel 
matching,  ) , ( k i ω is  
                                                 
9   The problem of dimensionality refers to the fact that if vector x  has many variables, it 
would be almost impossible to match each individual of the treatment group with 
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where  ) (⋅ K  is a kernel and h is the bandwidth. 
 
The standard propensity score matching estimator is  
∑ ∑














y k i y
n
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1 ˆ ω θ  




4.  THE DATA AND VARIABLES 
 
As usual in this kind of study, the empirical strategy and the data 
available interact, with one being the result of the other. In the previous 
section, I presented the methodology for propensity score matching, 
which requires having two comparison groups: the treated and the 
untreated students. However, the treated group is disaggregated to have 
different levels of treatment, generating different treated groups to be 
compared with the untreated group. 
 
In seeking these groups, the first step was to define the target 
population, according to the original rules of the program. As Table 1 
suggests, I focused on students who belong to the socioeconomic stratum 
(or Level 1), and discarded the other levels from 2 to 6. Besides, since 
the program also had a merit-based part related to the weighted average 
score, I focused on students who attained a grade point average of at 
least 12.
10
                                                 
10   Remember, in the Peruvian grading system, all scores are numbered in the range of 0-
20. 
 Even though some students who received a loan had a GPA 
below this level, I prefer to use this threshold to define a “potentially   15 
eligible student”. These two conditions (to belong to Level 1 and to have 
GPA >=12) were applied to both treated and untreated students, as a 
first step to ensure comparability between them. 
 
The second criterion to select the data is related to the long-term nature 
of the student loan program. To assess the impact, we need to give the 
students enough time to complete their course of study or take the 
decision of not studying anymore at PUCP. The data covered up to mid-
2009, so as a consequence I ruled out all students who were admitted 
from mid 2003 to later, given that Peruvian laws require that the 
curricula must take at least five years. Another restriction of the data was 
that it was very difficult to find good data for years before 1997, since 
most of the students’ information was recorded manually on paper forms, 
and the archives were periodically destroyed due to maintenance.  
 
For these reasons I was forced to work with students who were admitted 
to PUCP between the second semester of 1997 and the first semester of 
2003. Finally, I randomly selected 1219 students who belong to the 
subpopulation described above. From them, 350 students received the 
loan, and the remaining 869 did not receive it (see Table 2). 
 
Due to the small number of observations, only three distinct levels of 
treatment were considered as suggested by Table 2:  
 
S = 0: The student did not receive treatment; 
S = 1: if the student received treatment for 1 to 5 semesters; and  
S = 2: if he or she received the loan for 6 or more semesters. 
 
     16 
Table 2 
Number and Percentage of students in sample, by 
participation in the program 
Type of student  Frequencies  Percentage 
Untreated  869  71.29% 
Treated  350  28.71% 
Received treatment for 1 to 5 
semesters  163  13.37% 
Received treatment 6 or more 
semesters  187  15.34% 
     
Total  1,219  100% 
 
 
Concerning covariates, I obtained abundant information from the 
Household Socioeconomic Form (Ficha socioeconómica) that all students 
must fill out at the time they are admitted to PUCP. For all untreated 
students, the data available was for the first semester they studied at 
PUCP. For all treated students, the data was for the semester they 
applied for the loan, in which case they needed to update the information 
provided earlier. As a result, the data from this source was recorded 
before the treatment. It is an important requirement for good matching 
to control by pre-treatment covariates, and this data fulfills this requisite. 
 
The household socioeconomic form provided data on individual, family 
and dwelling characteristics, as well as family income. It is important to 
mention that we got information on declared and imputed family income. 
The first item was the income the student’s parents declared, and the 
second was the income which was calculated after a social worker visited 
the student’s home and checked the information provided in the 
socioeconomic form. Social workers checked bills, payslips and other 
sources of income. After reviewing the information, a report was written 
detailing all corrections that were made to declared income. 
 
This data was appended to the academic record of each student. These 
records included average grade point by semester, the school in which 
the student was enrolled, the semester each student received a loan, 
date of graduation, etc.   17 
The following table classifies some of the available variables into 4 
categories. There was more information in the household socioeconomic 
form, but I mainly used these covariates to avoid loss of data due to 
missing values. The first two are self-explanatory, but the remaining 
three categories need an explanation. The Cultural Capital category 
groups variables related to accumulation of education, experience, and 
moral values of the student. In Peru, the type of high school (private or 
public) provides information on this capital, due to big disparities in the 
level of education of each type  (BIRF, 2006).  Cultural differences by 
region also make it necessary to include the place of birth as a cultural 
capital variable. Social Capital is related to the “social environment” to 
which the student belongs, and it is represented in the list of variables by 
the income of the district in which the student lives (according to the 
human development index) and with whom the student resides.  The 






Classification of covariates 
Groups  Variables 




Number of students’ siblings living at home, Number of 
household members who suffer of chronic diseases
1 
Social and Cultural Capital   Parents’ level of education, Type of High School, Place of 
birth, quintile of district income (according to the human 
development index), with whom the student resides? 
Economic Capital   Income quintile, Other working relatives at home, 
Housing tenure, Number of floors in dwelling, Access to 
sewer system. 
1 Includes reports of household members with mental problems, disabilities, etc. Normally only 
serious diseases were reported in the household socioeconomic form. 
 
 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics of those quantitative variables in 
our sample. The groups “Cultural and Social Capital” and “Economic 
Capital” were reduced to only one dimension using multiple 
                                                 
11   I took the idea of grouping the variables in those definitions of capital from CID (2006).   18 
correspondence analyses. Positive values of these indexes are associated 
were higher needs. The respective indexes are shown in this table.  
 
The same table also shows that there are important differences between 
the treated and the control group. The standard mean test for equal 
means shows that treated students come from a subpopulation which has 
higher needs in comparison with untreated students, because the 
difference between the Cultural and Social Capital Index and the 
Economic Capital Index is significantly different from zero. There are also 
significant differences in the number of offspring living in the household 
(with greater numbers of offspring in households of treated students), 
and differences in the number of household members who suffer from 
chronic diseases (more frequent in treated households). These differences 
could be in response to either a self-selection process or the by PUCP 




Descriptive Statistics for Treated and Untreated Students 
  Average values     
  Treated  Untreated  Mean test  P-value 
Number of semesters  13.08286  13.14302  0.3380  0.7354 
  (350)  (867)     
Did the student complete the 
curricula by 2009? (1=yes, 0=No)  0.7514286  0.7139562  -1.3246  0.1855 
  (350)  (867)     
1= Male, 0 = Female  0.5057143  0.5294118  0.7487  0.4542 
  (350)  (867)     
Students Age (at the time of 
admission)  18.06571  18.08314  0.1197  0.9048 
  (350)  (866)     
Economic Capital Index  0.0223341  -0.0090457  -4.9184  0.0000 
  (339)  (837)     
Social and Cultural Capital Index  0.0125998  -0.0049568  -2.0517  0.0404 
  (310)  (788)     
Offspring of parents living in 
household  2.514451  2.283879  -3.1739  0.0015 
  (346)  (856)     
Number of household members 
who suffer of chronic diseases  0.8563218  0.6524249  -3.6187  0.0003 
  (348)  (866)     
Note.- Actual number of observations in parenthesis. This number varies due to missing values. 
Source: PUCP data bases.  
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Table 5 presents the comparison of treated versus non-treated students 
in a sample for qualitative variables. I found significant differences in the 
quintile of income in the sample. This result shows that, although I 
limited the student sample to individuals who belong to Level 1, there are 
income differences within this level, and the treated students seem to be 
“poorer” than the untreated ones. There are also differences in the 
“number of floors” of dwelling, with larger dwellings among the 
untreated. Also, the education of parents is lower for treated individuals. 
 
There are two more important differences in the observed covariates. One 
is the type of high school in which the individual studied before entering 
PUCP. The table says that an important percentage of treated students 
completed high school in a public school, whereas a large percentage of 
untreated students come from religious and private schools. As I 
mentioned before, this difference is important, because in Peru public 
schools are cheaper and quality of education is lower. Finally, many 
treated students were enrolled (at the time of evaluation) in the School of 
Sciences and Engineering (44%), while for untreated students that 
percentage was lower (32%). 
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Table 5 
Comparison of qualitative covariates 
(column percentages) 









1 (poorer)  31.61%  15.23  79.09  0.000 
2  26.15%  17.67     
3  19.54%  20.12     
4  12.36%  23.37     






None  57.31  53.23  6.02  0.110 
1 or 2   34.38  40.99     
3 or 4   6.02  4.27     
5 or more  2.29  1.5       
Housing 
Tenure 
Owner-occupancy  48.25  56.09  8.18  0.042 
Tenancy  15.5  13.61     
Paying by installments  0.29  0.95     
Others  35.96  29.35       
Number of 
floors 
1  78.86  74.45  5.65  0.059 
2  18.29  19.56     
3  2.86  5.98       
Access to 
sewer system 
No  0.87  0.12  4.18  0.041 





No education  0.00  0.00  17.33  0.015 
Incomplete primary school  0.35  0.29     
Complete primary school  5.57  3.3     
Incomplete high school  4.88  3.3     
Complete high school   31.71  31.66     
Incomplete technical 
education  0.00  0.14     
Complete technical 
education  9.76  10.32     
Incomplete higher 
education  12.54  6.59     





No education  0.31  0.24  11.23  0.189 
Incomplete primary school  0.92  0.84     
Complete primary school  8.92  6.25     
Incomplete high school  4.62  2.52     
Complete high school   40.92  40.14     
Incomplete technical 
education  0.31  0.00     
Complete technical 
education  7.38  9.86     
Incomplete higher 
education  5.54  4.93     
Complete higher education  31.08  35.22       
Type of high 
school before 
PUCP 
Public school  42.00  30.87  14.30  0.014 
Non-religious private 
school  28.57  34.22     
Private religious school  28.57  33.53     
 “Fe y Alegria” Program  0.29  0.58       
Armed Forces  0.29  0.58       21 
Parochial  0.29  0.23     
Place of birth  Provinces  18.29  19.79  0.36  0.547 
Lima  81.71  80.21       
With whom do 
you live? 
Parents  77.74  76.59  0.71  0.982 
Other relatives  16.32  16.81     
Friends  0.59  0.36     
Boarding house  2.97  3.48     
Others  0.89  1.08     
Parents and relatives  1.48  1.68     
Quintile of 
district income 
Poorest  4.05  2.71  6.20  0.185 
Poorer   17.63  14.02     
Average wealth  28.9  26.86     
Richer  33.53  37.69     




accountability  9.43  14.42  33.66  0.000 
Architecture and urbanism  0.86  1.15     
Art  2.29  1.73     
Sciences and engineering  44.57  32.3     
Social sciences  7.43  4.38     
Communications arts and 
sciences  11.14  11.19     
Law  14.86  19.38     
Education  3.71  4.73     
General studies: sciences  2.00  1.61     
Administration and 
executive studies  0.29  1.15     
Liberal arts and humanities  3.43  7.96       
Source: PUCP data bases. 
 
 
5.  ESTIMATION AND RESULTS 
 
In this section, I present the main results of this research. The impact 
was calculated by two  methods:  regression analysis  and  standard 




Impact on the number of semesters 
The first method to measure the impact of student loans is a parametric 
regression, in which a linear regression model is estimated by ordinary 
least squares. In this regression, the dependent variable is the number of 
semesters  a student took to attain a degree, and I explore the 
significance of a dummy variable of participating in the program. As   22 
suggested in the empirical strategy section, I evaluate the impact 
defining subsamples with respect to the intensity of the treatment and I 
regress a linear model to each subsample. Therefore, the first column of 
estimates in Table 6 works with the subsample of students who received 
treatment for fewer than 6 semesters plus those untreated students. The 
last column presents the estimates for the same regression when the 
subsample contains all students who received the loan for 6 or more 
semesters plus the untreated students. 
 
In the calculation of the impact on the number of semesters, I use only 
the sample of students who graduated by the end of 2009. In my opinion, 
it does not make sense to analyze this kind of impact for students who 
quit studying and left their programs. Table 6 shows that the impact of 
student loans is greater as long as the student receives the loan for more 
semesters. According to the OLS estimates, the impact is not significantly 
different from zero when a student receives treatment for fewer than 6 
semesters. Going over the impact of controls, only students’ sex and age 
seem to have a significant impact. As I mention in section 3, we cannot 
trust on these OLS results, but they are presented here only as reference 
values.  
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Table 6 
OLS estimates (restricted to students who graduated by the end 2009) 
Dep. Var.: Time a student 
needed to complete the 
course of study 
Subsamples 
Variables 
Treated 1 to 5 semesters 
vs. untreated 
Treated 6 or more 
semesters vs. untreated 
Received Loan=1, Not 
received = 0 
-0.00536  -0.509*** 
  (0.219)  (0.183) 
Sex (1= Male, 0 = Female)  0.276*  0.292* 
  (0.161)  (0.151) 
Students Age (at the time of 
admission) 
0.172***  0.161*** 
  (0.0390)  (0.0363) 
Economic Capital Index  1.207  0.589 
  (0.782)  (0.742) 
Social and Cultural Capital 
Index 
0.664  0.308 
  (0.607)  (0.565) 
Offspring of parents living in 
household 
0.0481  0.0741 
  (0.0726)  (0.0692) 
Number of household 
members who suffer of 
chronic diseases 
0.153  0.0647 
  (0.0935)  (0.0863) 
(dummies for undergraduate 
schools not shown)  
   
Constant  9.932***  10.13*** 
  (0.712)  (0.660) 
     
Observations  657  698 
R-squared  0.175  0.181 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Now let’s present the result of the non-parametric matching. In Table 7 
we see the estimates of the average treatment effect on the treated, with 
two different levels of treatment, 
0 , 1 θ  and 
0 , 2 θ . In the first case (top part 
of the table), under the three methods (nearest neighbor, radius and 
kernel) I do not find any significant difference in the number of semester 
between treated and control groups when the treatment was applied for 
less than 6 semesters. On the other hand, in the bottom part of the table 
we see that the impact of the program is significantly different from zero 
(except  when it is calculated with the nearest neighbor method.)  The 
impact is around 0.5 semesters, meaning that students who receive the 
loan complete their course of study earlier than those students without   24 
loan. This result is similar to that found in a similar work in Colombia (see 
CID, 2006). 
 
Even though this effect  may look “small”, we should note that the 
minimum number of semesters to complete the curricula is 10, and in 
some schools it could take 11 semesters to graduate
12
 
. If we discount 
this minimum number of semesters from the calculated averages we see 
that the amount of the impact is not negligible. 
As a final comment, note that the estimates of the average treatment 




 Impact of the program on the number of semesters 
 
Nearest 
neighbor  Radius  Kernel 
Subsample S = 0 or 
S = 1       
Treated  13.563  13.563  13.563 
Control  13.500  13.595  13.625 
0 , 1 ˆ θ   0.063  -0.032  -0.062 
T-stat  0.195  -0.131  -0.241* 
       
Subsample S = 0 or 
S = 2       
Treated  13.161  13.161  13.161 
Control  13.599  13.625  13.634 
0 , 2 ˆ θ   -0.438  -0.465  -0.473 
Tstat  -1.611  -2.602  -2.479 





Effect on the probability of degree completion 
In this section I explore the effect of the program on the probability of 
completing the studies at PUCP. As it is known, students with economic 
difficulties may stop studying for some semesters and may never meet 
                                                 
12   In the School of Law, the course of study requires at least 12 semesters.   25 
graduation requirements.  I calculate the effect by Probit regression 
analysis and by propensity score matching. Unlike estimation in section 




Probit Marginal Effects 
Dep. Var: 1=Student 
graduated from college, 0 = 
Student did not graduated 
Subsamples 
Variables 
Treated 1 to 5 semesters 
vs. untreated 
Treated 6 or more 
semesters vs. untreated 
Received Loan=1, Not received 
= 0 
-0.0282  0.0794** 
  (0.0442)  (0.0346) 
Sex (1= Male, 0 = Female)  -0.138***  -0.136*** 
  (0.0319)  (0.0306) 
Students Age (at the time of 
admission) 
-0.0159**  -0.0104 
  (0.00694)  (0.00679) 
Economic Capital Index  0.122  0.0806 
  (0.150)  (0.144) 
Social and Cultural Capital 
Index 
-0.311**  -0.271** 
  (0.125)  (0.117) 
Offspring of parents living in 
household 
-0.00760  -0.0128 
  (0.0130)  (0.0128) 
Number of household members 
who suffer of chronic diseases 
-0.00696  -0.0175 
  (0.0169)  (0.0160) 
(dummies for undergraduate 
schools not shown) 
   
     
Observations  889  921 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 8 shows the results of the Probit marginal effects for the two 
subsamples. Again we observe a significant impact when the student 
received treatment for at least 6 semesters only. It is also interesting to 
say that results suggests that the probability of degree completion is 
higher for women than for men, and it is less likely for individual with 
lower social and cultural capital. As before, the regression results are 
shown as reference values, and I will not try to explore or correct any 
econometric problem in the estimation of this equation.   26 
 
Now, let’s see the results of the propensity score matching in Table 9, 
where the three methods are presented. I could say that these results are 
similar to those in table 7 because the impact is not significantly different 
from zero when the intensity of the treatment is “less than six 
semesters”. In contrast, we find significant effects when the intensity is 
high (six or more semesters), except for the nearest neighbor method. 
The impact is not also very big: the probability of degree completion 
increases in about 8% for treated students. 
 
An explanation for this apparent “small” effect relies on the selection of 
students who participate in the program. Recall that this is also a merit-
based program, and in the selection of the sample, I also picked students 
which could be considered as “good”. So, conditional on being a “good” 
student, the program increases the probability of attaining  a bachelor 
degree in 8%. If the program were based on economic necessities only, it 
could include some “bad” students, which are not good just because they 
suffer serious problems that affect their performance as students. If this 








neighbor  Radius  Kernel 
Subsample S = 0 or 
S = 1       
Treated  0.7007299  0.7007299  0.7007299 
Control  0.7737226  0.7408786  0.7284339 
0 , 1 ˆ θ   -0.073  -0.040  -0.028 
T-stat  -1.282  -0.943  -0.575* 
       
Subsample S = 0 or 
S = 2       
Treated  0.8353659  0.8353659  0.8353659 
Control  0.7743902  0.7545154  0.7546442 
0 , 2 ˆ θ   0.061  0.081  0.081 
Tstat  1.222  2.409  2.183 
* Based on bootstrapped standard errors   27 
 




6.  CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
 
In this paper we have shown that controlling for observables 
characteristics, we can estimate the impact of student loans on the time a 
student need to complete his studies at PUCP and the probability of 
degree completion. 
 
An important conclusion of this study is that in both cases, the impact is 
important only when a student receives the loan for 6 or more semesters. 
Students who received loans for less than 6 semesters do not show on 
average different outcomes than a control group with similar observable 
characteristics. 
 
Nevertheless, this methodology does not control for unobserved 
covariates which may invalid this procedure. In addition, due to the 
nature of this program, which is a long run program, it is reasonable to 
think that some unobservable covariates may have changed along the 
time. 
 
Further analysis should explore the accomplishment of assumption (2). It 
is difficult to test it, but the knowledge of the program rules suggests that 
there could exist “selection on unobservables” because the participation 
in the program depends not only on financial needs but also on (a) 
student preferences for “working and studying” and “only studying”, (b) 
student motivation on studies as a personal effort, (c) other psychological 
aspects of students personalities. This work cannot control these effects 
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